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By Democratic Audit
William Gladstone might have the answer to the ‘West Lothian’
question
The West Lothian Question has been a constant thorn in the side of devolution efforts for over 100 years. The
McKay Commission was tasked with finding a meaningful answer, and finally reported in March 2013. Iain
McLean, in reviewing the report, argues policy-makers should revisit a proposal which was explicitly ruled out
of the commission’s terms of reference and would see a reduction in the numbers – though not the powers –
of MPs from devolved territories in the way that applied to Northern Ireland between 1922 and 1979.
The Commission on the Consequences of  Devolution, also known as the McKay Commission, reported
quietly in March 2013. Its remit had been to consider how the Commons should handle legislation that
af f ects only part of  the UK, now that domestic policy, to varying degrees, has been devolved to Scotland,
Wales, and Northern Ireland. It was not, however, instructed not ‘to deal with matters of  f inance in the
context of  the devolution settlements or with the representation of  the devolved areas at Westminster ’.
This is Hamlet without the prince: f inance and representation are the big unsolved questions in UK
devolution. But f or news about Claudius, Laertes and Polonius, read on.
The Commission examines solutions to the ‘West Lothian Question’ (WLQ) other than cutting the numbers
of  MPs f rom Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. The WLQ, properly stated, relates to the powers of
MPs (and in principle peers) not f rom a given part of  the UK to alter legislation that af f ects only that part. In
the past, it has severely af f ected Scotland, Wales and (Northern) Ireland. The Poll Tax was introduced in
Scotland only by an Act which the majority of  Scottish MPs opposed. Older examples include the blocking of
Welsh church ref orm f rom 1868 to 1920, coercion Acts in nineteenth-century Ireland, and the Patronage Act
(Scotland) 1711/12, violating the then recent Act of  Union.
However the WLQ can now only af f ect England. WLQ misf ires in England include the def eats of  the Church
of  England Prayer Book in 1927–1928 and f our votes on hospital and higher education f unding in 2003–
2004. In these votes on English bills, most English MPs opposed an outcome which carried only on Scottish
and Welsh votes. A growing plurality of  the people want to see English Votes on English Laws (EVOEL).
The Commission want that to become a constitutional convention. But how can it be implemented, as they
wish, without ‘taking f unctions or powers away f rom MPs f rom outside England (or England-and-Wales)’
(para 146)? It cannot, because MPs f rom outside England have to surrender something. McKay rejects:
1. An English Parliament;
2. Regional assemblies f or each English region;
3. Reduction in the numbers of  MPs f rom Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland;
4. Formal reduction in their powers;
5. A double- lock f or English MPs.
Regional assemblies are dead af ter one was massively voted down in the North-east in 2004. An English
Parliament, f or a territory including 85% of  the population of  the UK, would be so unbalanced that the
f ederation would be unstable.
A double- lock provides that ‘legislation could only be passed if  there is both a majority of  MPs f rom
England and a majority of  the House of  Commons as a whole in f avour ’. Since it is what the people of
England (and the Conservative party) want, what could be wrong with that?
In past years, William Gladstone wrestled with all these issues. In 1886, he proposed excluding Irish
Members f rom the Commons altogether af ter devolution, but that is taxation without representation. In
1893 he proposed an ‘in-and-out’ solution: both a double- lock (such that only non-Irish MPs voted on non-
Irish business) and a clear statement of  the territorial scope of  each clause of  each bill. But he rejected his
own idea because ‘it passes the wit of  man’ to def ine the territorial scope of  a bill; and ‘because opinion
touches responsibility’.
Where a government, such as his, has a majority in the UK but lacks one in England, then with a double- lock
it loses any or all of  its England-only business. Who then would be the government of  England? Gladstone
theref ore chose McKay’s rejected option no. 3: a (modest) reduction in the number of  Irish MPs. His caustic
colleague Sir William Harcourt retorted that f if ty Irish MPs may be as decisive as 100, and that ‘you don’t
get rid of  [Irish interf erence] any more than the young woman did of  the baby by saying it ’s such a litt le
one’.
McKay proposes to beef  up the territorial extent statements on each bill; and to improve the discussion of
‘Sewel motions’ received f rom the three devolved parliaments, permitt ing the UK parliament to legislate on
their turf . Elsewhere, McKay proposes questions rather than answers, f or example;
How can ‘English Votes on English Laws’ apply to secondary legislation?
Or to Commons consideration of  Lords’ amendments to bills? (Good questions: and they give rise to
another, how should the Lords handle England-only business?)
The central recommendation is that English (plus sometimes Welsh) MPs should have not a double- lock,
but a double-count:
“the determining majority would be that in the overall vote, as has always been the case. But if  a
government was seen to have f ailed to attract the support of  a majority of  MPs f rom England (or England-
and-Wales) f or business af f ecting those interests, it would be likely to sustain severe polit ical damage.
But this is a pretty sof t constraint. When the parliamentary stakes are high enough, a determined
government with tough whips would know that votes on a particular bill are subsumed in noise at election
time. The 2003–2004 votes on f oundation hospitals and tuit ion f ees did not decide the 2005 election.
At the other extreme, a constraint as sof t as McKay’s would not have prevented the 1914 civil war that
would have broken out in protestant Ireland but f or the First World War. Most parliaments then had
Commons majorit ies f or the parties prepared to enact Home Rulef or Ireland. Their Unionist opponents held
the majority of  seats in England, except f rom 1906–1910. With the Liberal and Irish parties claiming to
govern the UK and the Unionists claiming to ‘speak f or England (and ‘Ulster ’)’, the outcomes included the
Curragh Mutiny and Larne gunrunning of  spring 1914. The double-count is weak if  the issues are non-
salient (f oundation hospitals and university f unding), AND if  they are existential, as f rom 1885 to 1918.
There is no easy answer to the West Lothian Question. What McKay shows is that Gladstone knew best, al
biet inadvertently. Having rejected both ‘taxation without representation’ and ‘in-and-out’, he proposed a
reduction in the numbers, but not the powers, of  MPs f rom (Scotland, Wales and Northern) Ireland, which
McKay rejected. Among other things, this solution deals with the problem of  ‘Barnett consequentials’. In
brief , expenditure in England in year 1 helps to determine the block grant to Scotland, Wales and Northern
Ireland in year 2. The resultant changes in block grant f rom year to year are called Barnett consequentials.
Their existence allows Scots and Welsh MPs to claim that England-only business is their business too.
That speaks f or them to be represented in Westminster, but not at their proportion of  the population.
Fewer of  them would still be able to vote on UK business, Barnett consequentials included.
What about Harcourt’s housemaid’s baby? There is a mathematical answer. Fif ty non-English MPs are less
than half  as likely to be decisive against a majority f rom England than are a hundred. The twelve Ulster
Unionists who sat in the Commons f rom 1922 to 1974 never on their own made a decisive majority to
overrule the English. (They contributed to the Prayer Book def eats, but only with the Scots and Welsh.)
Reduction in numbers is the least worst solution to the WLQ. A smaller number of  MPs relative to England
might help McKay’s conventions to stick and keep non-English MPs out of  English business.
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